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Abstract 
This paper contends that the relationship between democracy and modern constitutionalism 
possesses an underappreciated complexity, which, unless addressed, prevents us from 
embracing the challenge to constitutionalism or the possibilities open to it in today’s 
globalising world. That complexity is revealed by treating democracy as an incomplete ideal, 
referring both to the empirical incompleteness of democracy as unable to supply its own 
terms of application—the internal dimension—and to the normative incompleteness of 
democracy as guide to good government—the external dimension. This double-edged 
incompleteness explains the contingent necessity of modern constitutionalism. 
Constitutionalism is a necessary response to democratic incompleteness—seeking both to 
realise democracy (the internal dimension) and to supplement and qualify democracy (the 
external dimension). Yet, if incomplete democracy requires the accompaniment of 
constitutionalism, such incompleteness also means that democratic considerations cannot 
specify definitively the content of constitutionalism. The content of constitutionalism as a 
means to completing democracy, therefore, remains contingent upon other normative and 
practical considerations. Democratic incompleteness thus remains both the justificatory 
foundation for contemporary constitutionalism and the main reason for its inherent fragility. 
The paper proceeds by examining the relationship between democracy and constitutionalism 
along various internal, external and mixed dimensions, observing that some of the ways in 
which constitutionalism treats democracy recur over time and circumstance. Yet how 
democratic incompleteness manifests itself, and how constitutionalism responds to 
incompleteness, also evolves and alters, revealing the relationship between constitutionalism 
and democracy as iterative. The paper then concentrates on the iteration emerging from the 
current globalising wave. The fact that states are no longer either the exclusive sites of 
democratic authority or the only constitutional entities and sources compounds democratic 
incompleteness and complicates how constitutionalism responds. Nevertheless, it is argued, 
the historical role of constitutionalism in political modernity as key to addressing the double 
incompleteness of democracy persists under globalisation, as does democracy’s inability to 
supply all vital terms of constitutionalism. This continuity reflects how the deep moral order 
of political modernity, in particular the emphasis on individualism, equality, collective 
agency and collective self-improvement, remains constant while its institutional architecture, 
including the forms of its commitment to democracy, evolves. Constitutionalism, itself both a 
basic orientation and a set of design principles for that architecture, remains a necessary 
support for and supplement to democracy. Yet postnational constitutionalism, even more than 
its state-centred predecessor, remains contingent upon non-democratic considerations, so 
reinforcing constitutionalism’s normative and sociological vulnerability. This conclusion 
challenges two dominant but opposing understandings of the postnational constitutionalism 
of the global age—both that which indicts global constitutionalism because of its weakened 
democratic credentials and that which assumes that these weakened democratic credentials 
pose no problem for postnational constitutionalism, which may instead thrive through a 
heightened emphasis on non-democratic values. 
 
Keywords 
Constitutionalism, Globalisation, Democracy, Modernity. 
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I. Introduction 
The present paper contends that the relationship between democracy and modern 
constitutionalism is possessed of a degree of complexity that is often underappreciated, and 
that, unless we address that complexity, we will be unable to come to terms with the nature of 
the challenge posed to constitutional thinking or the possibilities open to it in today’s 
globalising world. The complexity of the relationship between democracy and 
constitutionalism, I begin by suggesting, is perhaps best approached and appreciated through 
conceiving of democracy—understood in its most general, classical sense1 as ‘the ideal of 
government by act of the people’2—as an incomplete ideal. That incompleteness is double-
edged. It refers both to the empirical incompleteness of democracy as a notion unable to 
supply its own terms and conditions of application—call this the internal dimension of 
incompleteness—as well as to the moral or normative incompleteness of democracy as a 
guide to good government—call this the external dimension of incompleteness. In turn, this 
double-edged incompleteness accounts for the contingent necessity of modern 
constitutionalism. On the one hand, constitutionalism justifies its place as a necessary feature 
of the modern political configuration—a configuration in which, as we shall see, the values 
expressed by and through democracy are undoubtedly of central importance— by answering 
each form of democracy’s incompleteness. It does so both by helping to realise democracy 
(the internal dimension) and by seeking to supplement and perhaps qualify democracy (the 
external dimension). On the other hand, if democracy in its double incompleteness requires 
the accompaniment of constitutionalism, those very same features of incompleteness mean 
that democratic considerations are insufficient to specify in any definitive fashion the content 
of constitutionalism. Just as democracy cannot ‘complete itself’, so to speak, so too the 
content of constitutionalism as a vital means to the completion of democracy cannot be 
supplied solely through the resources of democracy; that content, therefore, remains 
contingent upon other normative and practical considerations. Democratic incompleteness, in 
other words, remains both the main justificatory foundation for contemporary 
constitutionalism and the main reason why that justificatory foundation remains inherently 
fragile.  
If we turn to examine the practical unfolding of the relationship between democracy 
and constitutionalism, we can see that some of the ways in which modern constitutionalism 
treats democracy along the internal and external dimensions of incompleteness are constant 
                                                
1 Its classical origins are of course Greek. Democracy is a compound of demos (people) and kratos (power).  
2 FW Michelman Brennan and Democracy (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998) 4. 
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or recurrent over time, just as are the types of answers constitutionalism supplies. However, 
the ways in which democratic incompleteness manifests itself, and in which constitutionalism 
responds to that incompleteness, also evolve and alter over time. The relationship between 
constitutionalism and democratic incompleteness is, in short, an iterative one.3 And the 
iteration with which we are most closely concerned in the present discussion is that which has 
emerged out of the current wave of globalisation. The development of a situation in which 
states are no longer either the exclusive sites of democratic authority or the only 
constitutional entities and sources has further compounded and complicated the ways in 
which democracy is rendered incomplete and how constitutionalism responds to that 
incompleteness. Nevertheless, I conclude, the historical role of constitutionalism in political 
modernity as a key means of addressing the double incompleteness of democracy remains 
intact under conditions of contemporary globalisation, just as does the inability of democracy 
to supply some of the vital terms of constitutionalism. This continuity, crucially, has to do 
with the way in which the deep moral order of political modernity remains constant even as 
its institutional architecture evolves. Constitutionalism as a basic orientation and mobile set 
of techniques remains a necessary support for and supplement to democracy in the global 
age—and this supportive connection to democracy provides constitutionalism’s abiding 
justification. Yet the emerging postnational constitutionalism, like state-centred 
constitutionalism before it, remains contingent upon non-democratic considerations—and 
indeed does so in a more emphatic fashion than before—so reinforcing constitutionalism’s 
abiding normative and sociological vulnerability. This conclusion stands as a challenge to the 
two dominant but opposing understandings of the new forms of postnational 
constitutionalism of the global age. It sets itself apart from these views that, on the one hand, 
offer a conclusive indictment of global constitutionalism because of its weakened democratic 
credentials. It also sets itself apart from those views that, on the other hand, assume that these 
much weakened democratic credentials pose no problem for postnational constitutionalism, 
which may thrive through its emphasis on other, non-democratic values.  
 
II. Constitutionalism and Democracy: A Contested Relationship 
The idea that I will defend and develop below, that modern constitutionalism stands in a 
double relationship to democracy, with the former both realising and qualifying the latter, is 
not one that has achieved ready acceptance. In the present Section I will try to explain why 
                                                
3 On the iterative quality of democracy, see S Benhabib Another Cosmopolitanism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006) ch 2. 
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this is the case, and with what distorting consequences for much of contemporary 
constitutional theory, including those aspects of constitutional theory that have emerged in 
the global age. The critique of contemporary constitutional theory that I seek to develop 
provides a point of comparison and instruction for my own subsequent theory-building.  
Rather than as the kind of double- or multi-level relationship that I will propose, the 
relationship between modern constitutionalism and democracy demonstrates a long historical 
tendency to be viewed in singular terms, as if it were capable of being captured in just one 
general relational proposition. Yet there is no single such singular sense, so to speak. Rather, 
the actual terms of the singular relationship between constitutionalism and democracy are 
understood quite differently and quite inconsistently between different writers and schools of 
thought. A broad but significant historical trend is evident here. Crudely, what we have 
witnessed is a shift from a longstanding tendency for democracy and modern 
constitutionalism to be viewed in a relationship of mutual opposition, or at least pronounced 
mutual tension, to one in which, with the exponential spread of a democratically-centred 
political morality over the second half of the twentieth century, they have come to be viewed 
as standing in an entirely or predominantly mutually supportive relationship—albeit this 
supportive relationship is itself accounted for on quite different grounds. What is more, with 
the development of postnational ways of thinking about constitutionalism in the global age, 
we are entering a new phase—one that recalls but moves beyond the dominant themes of 
both predecessor phases. In response to a new and starker tension between democracy and 
constitutionalism there is emerging a sharp division between two opposing singular 
conceptions—between those who adhere to democracy’s centrality to constitutionalism but 
doubt its viability in the postnational domain and those who would make a virtue out of 
constitutionalism’s independence from democracy. 
But why and how has modern constitutional thinking developed along these lines? It 
is important to pay attention to the adjective ‘modern’ in beginning our account of this series 
of changes. The idea of a constitution, already extended beyond its original reference to 
physical organisms, undoubtedly possessed a robust pre-modern tradition. Yet, prior to the 
age of the modern state, the idea of the constitution tended to be applied in political discourse 
in a quite different way from its subsequent usage. It was utilised in a historical-descriptive 
manner, referring—in accordance with its underlying biological metaphor—to the political 
way of life of a community in quasi-organic terms. This quasi-organic structure was 
traditionally imagined and portrayed in a highly concrete fashion, as the developed ‘body 
politic’—the entirety of ways and means and customs of political life. In late mediaeval times 
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it gradually came to refer, more abstractly, to the institutional form and complex of the 
political settlement. However, it was not until the advent of the modern state, and in 
particular the early peak of documentary constitutionalism in the United States and France at 
the end of the 18th century, that this process of abstraction was completed. The constitution 
now assumed a doubly normative character. Not only had it begun to refer to the specifically 
legal mode of articulation and regulation of the body politic (as opposed to the institutional 
consequences of that articulation), but also, in a more transformative stage of juridification, 
through the medium of the early written constitutions that legal modality now came to be 
seen as constitutive or generative of that body politic.4 The documentary constitution became, 
in Tom Paine’s words, ‘a thing antecedent to a government’,5 a blueprint of how the body 
politic should be organised rather than a simple reflection of how it was organised. 
It is this sense of law, and in particular constitutional law, as somehow being ‘in 
charge’6—as providing the normative lodestar for the body politic, that provides the key to 
understanding how modern constitutionalism in its original conception came to be viewed as 
standing in a relationship of tension with democracy. Crucially, the initial distinction—and 
the initial distinctiveness—of the modern constitutional state lay in its contrast with its 
absolutist predecessor of the 16th and 17th centuries. In the early absolutist form of the state 
there had emerged for the first time, in reaction to the partial and fragmented authority 
structures of the feudal age, a monopolisation and centralisation of political power as an 
indivisible public domain. But, in its incipient form, that indivisible public domain was one in 
which positive law was the instrument rather than the source of sovereign power. 
Subsequently, in its new ‘constitutive’ variant, constitutional law claimed to reverse this 
relationship. Modern constitutionalism, therefore, came first and foremost to be defined in 
functional opposition to absolutism, as a guarantee of limited (by law) government as 
opposed to unlimited government. In turn, as this notion of constitutionalism as an ideal of 
limited government took hold, such a conception did not fundamentally discriminate between 
the different expressions of ‘sovereign’ authority which should be the due subject of 
constitutional jurisdictio.7 The democratic or popular form of sovereignty was as much a 
                                                
4 On these historical trends, see eg D Grimm ‘The Constitution in the Process of Denationalisation’ (2005) 12 
Constellations 447; M Loughlin The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) esp chs 3–6; 
C Thornhill ‘Towards a Historical Sociology of Constitutional Legitimacy’ (2008) 37 Theory and Society 161–
197. 
5 T Paine The Rights of Man (New York: St Martins, 1988) 29.  
6 J Waldron ‘Is The Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?’ (2002) 21 Law and Philosophy 
17–64, 157. 
7 See G Sartori ‘Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion,’ (1962) 56 American Political Science Review 
853–64. 
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form of potentially overweening and abusive authority, and so as much in need of checking, 
as were the monarchical or aristocratic forms of sovereignty.  
What is more, democracy remained a tenuous and unsettled as well as a suspicious 
object of constitutional thought, since—as we shall see—the extent to which democratic 
forms of government actually succeeded in taking root under the early settlements of modern 
constitutionalism itself remained highly uneven, partial and subject to frequent reversal until 
the mid 20th century and beyond. Accordingly, for philosophical and empirical reasons—
both because democracy was understood to harbour its own threats to the idea of limited 
government and because democratic institutions were in any case a slow and faltering 
development of the modern state8—constitutionalism in its early modern form tended not to 
place democracy at its normative centre but rather as something lurking at the margins to be 
tamed and constrained.9 
The semiotics of recent state-centred constitutional theory increasingly suggest an 
inversion of this historical understanding. Constitutional theorists of the late twentieth 
century have typically been at pains to reconcile constitutionalism and democracy. This has 
much to do with the unprecedented prominence of the democratic idea today. The 20th 
century has been labelled by some as the Democratic Century,10 the high point in the pursuit 
of ‘the ideal of government by act of the people.’11 It is, according to Amartya Sen, the age in 
which democracy has ceased to be understood in its various localities as a purely local need 
and has come instead to be endorsed as a ‘universal commitment’ and so as a ‘normal’ 
template of government.12 Crudely, there are positive and negative reasons for this. 
Positively, the 20th century, and more precisely the second half of the 20th century, saw 
unprecedented success for the democratic project. By 1941, in the depths of the Second 
World War, there were only 13 countries in the world who still could meet the most basic 
criteria of democratic self-government. Yet by the end of the century, as many as 119 out of 
                                                
8 Of course, there is also a causal relationship between these two trends. One of the reasons why democracy was 
such a slow developer was precisely because the constitutionalist argument for ‘limited government’ could be so 
effectively deployed against it, and vice-versa. 
9 This is not the place to document that claim in full. However, if we take only the American debate, few would 
doubt Dworkin’s claim that it has until recently been ‘the near unanimous view’ of American constitutional 
scholars and lawyers that a strong conception of constitutionalism, especially as articulated through a strong 
version of judicial review, is one that compromises democracy. See Dworkin Freedom’s Law: The Moral 
Reading of the American Constitution (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996) 18.  
10 Freedom House Report Democracy’s Century: A Survey of Global Political Change in the 20th Century (New 
York: Freedom House, 1999). 
11 Michelman (n 2). 
12 A Sen ‘Democracy as a Universal Value’ (1999) 10 Journal of Democracy 3–17. 
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192 states could be described as electoral democracies.13 In numerous cases democracy 
remained, and remains today, an extremely fragile flower, poorly embedded within the local 
political culture, threatened and compromised by myriad external pressures in a globalised 
world. But even if practice often remains deficient, there is no doubting the relentless spread 
of democracy’s rhetorical endorsement. 
 Negatively, moreover, the ideal of democratic self-government has gained traction 
because of the absence of credible alternative universal ideals of political organisation. For 
the 20th century was also the century of disillusionment, its various and contending totalising 
ideologies progressively discredited as culpable agents in an unprecedented ‘age of 
extremes’.14 Fundamental belief systems, ‘thick’ and comprehensive doctrines of the good 
life, of course, retain a strong sociological presence today, indeed perhaps more so now than 
at any time since the mid-20th century.15 However, the idea that such belief systems should 
prevail as global ideals founders both on the equally implacable conviction of opposite 
fundamentalisms and on the scepticism of countless others. From this perspective, 
democracy’s attraction is as the lesser evil; its distinction remains, according to Winston 
Churchill’s famous aphorism, ‘as the worst form of government except all those other forms 
that have been tried from time to time.’16 
But if the increasing centrality of democracy to political discourse and practice 
produced significant efforts towards the reconciliation of democracy and constitutionalism, 
the variation we find in the terms of that reconciliation betrays certain older tensions. At one 
end of the spectrum, there are those who tend to ‘define up’ democracy to meet a thicker 
sense of constitutional self-government. At the other end of the spectrum there are those for 
whom constitutionalism is ‘defined down’ to meet a thinly proceduralist conception of 
democracy. And in between these positions we find a wide range of options where 
democracy and constitutionalism meet each other ‘half-way’, so to speak. 17 
                                                
13 See Freedom House Report (n 10); see more generally, J Keane The Life and Death of Democracy (London: 
Simon and Schuster, 2009). 
14 E Hobsbawm The Age of Extremes: The Short 20th Century (London: Michael Joseph, 1994). 
15 See eg, M Ruthven Fundamentalism: The Search for Meaning (Oxford: OUP, 2005). 
16 Quoted in Keane (n 13) 581.  
17 For an excellent overview of contemporary constitutional theory’s treatment of democracy, and, in particular, 
its tendency to view ‘constitutional democracy [as] a tautology rather than an oxymoron’ (90) see R Bellamy 
Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007) esp ch 3. Bellamy’s classification of the ways in which constitutionalism is 
reconciled with democracy is more detailed than the one I deploy in the present article, but the basic distinction 
between those forms of reconciliation based on a ‘thickened-up’ definition of democracy and those based on a 
‘thinned-down’ version of constitutionalism also informs his approach.  
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Ronald Dworkin provides a prominent example of those who would ‘define up’ 
democracy in ambitious terms to satisfy a thicker sense of constitutional self-government. For 
him, democracy requires ‘that collective decisions be made by political institutions whose 
structure, composition and practice treat all members of the community as individuals, with 
equal concern and respect.’18 This demands, therefore, not just the most basic constitutive 
rights and structures of democratic participation (voting rights, the right to run for office, a 
reasonably representative electoral system, legal recognition of political parties, etc) and 
other direct preconditions of democracy (most obviously, freedom of expression and 
association) but a whole additional set of protections against any institutionally authored, 
facilitated or merely permitted abuses and deprivations that might undermine equal respect 
and concern broadly conceived.  
At the other extreme, we find positions at or close to the ‘pure procedural’19 pole, 
where constitutionalism is ‘defined down’ as a means to serve the ends of a democratic 
process of government. This kind of stance, associated with writers such as John Hart Ely20 
and Robert Post21 in recent years, understands constitutionalism as lacking any democracy-
independent moral foundations. Instead, constitutional thinking and the constitutional process 
exists only to ensure that political decision-making and the public debate that informs 
political decision-making is accessible to all interests and preferences on equal terms. 
If these polar positions see democracy as subservient to an idea of the ‘good’ 
constitutional polity, or conversely, constitutionalism as subservient to democracy conceived 
of as a purely procedural ideal, a third set of intermediate positions avoids subservience in 
either direction but nevertheless retains a commitment to the idea of democracy and 
constitutionalism as fundamentally mutually supportive ideals. Jürgen Habermas, to take a 
prominent and highly influential example of this middle way, understands constitutional 
democracy as located in the symbiotic relationship between private and public autonomy in 
the era of political modernity.22 The protection of a sphere of individual autonomy and the 
guarantee of an inclusive public domain of political discourse and participation are seen as 
twin and indeed co-original virtues of the modern age. And while their common origins 
                                                
18 Dworkin (n 9) 17. 
19 To use Michelman’s term; (n 2) 39. 
20 JH Ely Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1981).  
21 R Post Constitutional Domains: Democracy, Community, Management (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1995). 
22 See in particular J Habermas, ‘Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?’ 
(2001) 29 Political Theory 766–81. 
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suggest some level of moral compatibility or interconnection,23 in the final analysis each 
virtue remains irreducible to the other. That is to say, there is no relationship of normative 
subordination or subsumption in either direction, There is, however, a key relationship of 
empirical interdependence. Not only is private autonomy deemed to be a factual prerequisite 
of effective public autonomy and of a healthy domain of political participation, but, 
reciprocally, the latter also offers the best guarantee of the continued protection of private 
autonomy. What we have, in short, is a conception of constitutional democracy where, unlike 
‘defined up’ democracy or ‘defined down’ constitutionalism, a measure of normative 
distinction between the values associated with democratic process (public autonomy) and 
those associated with constitutionalism more broadly (private and public autonomy) is 
conceded, but where this divergence is deemed not to require any trade-off between them due 
to the mutually supportive causal relationship which obtains between the operation of the two 
sets of values.  
These are all powerful and influential positions, but none of them tells the whole story 
of the relationship between democracy and constitutionalism. Indeed, their very divergence 
inter se offers some indication of what is missing from each. In their desire to hold 
constitutionalism compatible with democracy, they tend to paint an unbalanced picture. On 
the one hand, they succeed in deepening our understanding of the ways in which certain prior 
constitutional notions are indeed necessary to the articulation of democracy, and to that extent 
they mark an advance from the earlier orthodoxy of modern constitutional thought as 
concerned too much with the ‘limitation’ of ‘limited government’ and too little with its basic 
‘constitution’. On the other hand, however, in so doing they tend in their different ways to 
gloss over the continuing and unavoidable tensions between democracy and 
constitutionalism, and in particular the need for constitutionalism to draw upon resources 
other than democracy in its vital role of addressing the incompleteness of democracy. 
Whether by straining democracy beyond the limits of any broadly shared understanding of its 
terms and towards a thicker conception of constitutionalism which arguably stands beyond 
and perhaps against democracy, or by reducing constitutionalism to a purely democratic-
process supportive role and treating that supportive role as itself fully democratically 
specified, or by admitting some tensions between democracy and constitutionalism but 
resolving these by resort to a speculatively serendipitous causal formula, these theories tend 
to close prematurely the open question of the relationship between constitutionalism and 
                                                
23 This is further explored in Section V below. 
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democracy. In so doing, they cannot grasp the iterative and indeed irresoluble quality of the 
tension between democracy and constitutionalism, and how this may coexist with a 
relationship of mutual support.  
As we shall specify more fully in due course, if anything the tendency towards a 
diversity of singular understandings of the relationship between democracy and 
constitutionalism is amplified in the global age. However, this development takes place in a 
context where, in something of a reversal to the earlier modern tradition, democracy and 
constitutionalism again begin to appear in fundamental tension. On the one hand there are 
those, heirs to the more recent tradition of a democratically-rooted constitutionalism, for 
whom the very idea of constitutionalism is deeply imperilled by the severing of the umbilical 
chord connecting it to the democratic state.24 On the other hand there are those, heirs to the 
earlier tradition of modern constitutionalism as a bridle upon and limitation of public power, 
for whom constitutionalism can flourish anew beyond the declining range of the democratic 
nation state.25 Again, in their very singularity these understandings tend not to appreciate the 
overall picture, either overstating or understating constitutionalism’s dependence on 
democracy.  
 
III. Constitutionalism and Democratic Incompleteness 
Let me now set out the basic structure of my alternative understanding of the double 
relationship between constitutionalism and (incomplete) democracy. As already noted, in this 
perspective constitutionalism is necessary both to realise democracy and to supplement and 
perhaps qualify democracy. In so doing, constitutionalism is responding to the empirical and 
normative dimensions of the incompleteness of democracy respectively, and in both cases is 
bound to do so in terms which cannot themselves be fully justified by reference to democratic 
criteria. In the introductory Section it was noted that certain broad features of this double 
relationship have remained constant over the period of modern constitutionalism, and it is this 
continuity which allows us to disaggregate the relationship between constitutionalism and 
democracy into a number of settled sub-themes or dimensions. An examination of these sub-
themes will reveal the general ways in which constitutionalism functions to realise 
                                                
24 See eg Grimm (n 4).  
25 Much of the literature on the constitutionalisation of international law, for all its internal diversity of 
approach, takes this basically more optimistic line. Many representative examples of this genre can be found in 
two recent edited volumes; JL Dunoff and JP Trachtman (eds) Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, 
International Law, and Global Governance (Cambridge: CUP, 2009); J KlAbbérs, A Peters and G Ulfstein (eds) 
The Constitutionalisation of International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2009).  
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democracy, the general ways in which constitutionalism functions to supplement or qualify 
democracy, as well as providing a broad indication of how these two relational dimensions 
themselves interrelate. 
We can identify seven such sub-themes; namely authorship, stakeholding, 
representation, competence, non-democratic values, implementation and demarcation. The 
first four sub-themes—authorship, stakeholding, representation and competence—clearly 
relate to the question of realising democracy. The fifth sub-theme, non-democratic-values, 
clearly refers to the supplementation or qualification of democracy. And the last two sub-
themes—implementation and demarcation—straddle the divide between realising and 
supplementing or qualifying democracy. Let us now say rather more about the way in which 
modern constitutionalism has traditionally responded to democratic incompleteness across 
the seven dimensions. 
 
(a) Empirical incompleteness; constitutionalism as democracy-realising  
 
We will begin with the four clearly democracy-realising dimensions of the relationship 
between constitutionalism and democracy. First, constitutionalism addresses the deep 
question of authorship of the political community. Under what circumstances should an 
expression of political voice count as an act of constitution-making or constitution–
amending—as a basic initiation or adaptation of a community as a political community and 
so as the appropriate container of a democratic system of government (the when question)? 
Secondly, constitutionalism addresses the question of membership, or more broadly and more 
attuned to the relevant nuances, the question of stakeholding. Whose interests and preferences 
should be taken into account in the operation of the democratic system (the who question)? 
Thirdly, constitutionalism addresses the question of representation. Through what forms 
ought stakeholders, on the authority of the authors, be democratically represented (the which 
question)? And fourthly, constitutionalism addresses the question of prerequisite competence. 
What kinds of capacities are required of the stakeholders and their representatives for them to 
be competent (re)producers and operators of a democratic system, and what constitutional 
rights and protections are necessary to furnish these capacities? In other words, how do we 
ensure that the relevant actors possess the wherewithal to operate the political system in a 
democratic fashion (the wherewith question)? 
Let us now look at the various democracy-realising dimensions in a little more depth. 
What are the ingredients that constitutionalism supplies without which democracy cannot 
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realise itself, and in what sense are theses democracy-realising attributes dependent upon 
considerations other than purely democratic ones? Take first the question of authorship. This 
is traditionally viewed in constitutional theory through the concept, first developed by Abbé 
Sieyès, of pouvoir constituant or ‘constituent power’. In a tract that became the effective 
manifesto of the French Revolution,26 Sieyès sought to identify an originary polity-embracing 
power capable of giving birth to the constitutional settlement—the pouvoir constitué—and 
standing in some kind of relationship of pre-eminence over it. Constituent power, therefore, 
speaks to the most basic sense in which constitutionalism displays a ‘constitutive’ quality 
with regard to the (potentially) democratic polity. It energises the initial process—the 
constitutional convention, constituent assembly or other device—through which is produced 
the initial constitutional document for a polity (or, indeed, through which is generated any 
successor constitutional document that announces a new founding unauthorised by its 
predecessor), which in turn provides the necessary framing conditions and any additional 
norm-generating capacity for the fashioning and operation of democracy within that polity.  
 Arguably, too, any amendment of the constitution, involving an alteration of the 
framing document itself but in terms formally specified by the framing document, is also an 
act of authorship, in this case authorised but not exercised by the original framers, which will 
have a bearing on the ongoing fashioning and operation of any democratic settlement. Again 
here, constitutionalism provides a prerequisite to democracy, one that is necessary not in this 
latter case to ensure that democracy ‘gets going’, as in a founding document, but rather to 
ensure that democracy’s basic framing terms do not congeal and become a ‘dead letter’, 
insensitive to any changes in conditions which might affect their contextual suitability as 
basic framing terms.27 
Yet constitutionalism’s supply of the terms and conditions of authorship of the polity, 
although necessary to democracy, is not itself democratically determined. There can be no 
definitive democratic answer to the question of who is the popular sovereign—of who gets to 
constitute the polity and under what conditions. As Hans Lindahl puts it, the ‘collective self-
constitution’ of a political community ‘means constitution both by and of a collective self’.28 
                                                
26 A Sieyès ‘What is the Third Estate?’ (1789) ( Eng trans M Blondel, New York, Praeger, 1963).  
27 Of course, some part of the (controversial) argument in favour of a more ‘activist’ conception of judicial 
review, and against strongly originalist conceptions of the judicial role in constitutional interpretation, depends 
upon constitutional judges, in the absence of formal amendment, themselves assuming a quasi-amending role in 
response to post-foundational societal change. See eg SM Griffin American Constitutionalism: From Theory to 
Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press) ch 1. 
28 H Lindahl ‘Towards an Ontology of Collective Selfhood’ in M Loughlin and N Walker (eds) The Paradox of 
Constitutionalism (Oxford: OUP, 2007) 9–24, at 10. 
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The collective self duly constituted (the of) is the product of rather than identical with the 
collective self constituting (the by). It follows that whatever democratic credentials are 
possessed by the latter duly constituted body cannot be used to provide retrospective warrant 
for the democratic credentials of the earlier constituting body, which remains a body without 
any democratic pedigree beyond its own self-assertion. A similar problem of unfounded 
foundations attaches, at one remove, to formal amendments of the constitution. Here, the 
immediate credentials of the amending constituency are located in the founding document, 
which in its amending formula specifies the terms of that constituency. However, that 
founding document is itself but the product of the self-assertion of an originary and 
constituent body necessarily lacking its own democratic pedigree. Again, the work of the 
constitution in enabling democracy possesses no definitive democratic warrant.  
Of course, all this is to say is that collective selfhood is progressively as well as 
regressively authorised, and so we should be wary of overstating the difficulties the problem 
of origins poses to democratic theory. Democratic authority is reflexively constructed over 
time—it is about the continuously self-amending relationship of a collective self to itself 
rather than a seamless continuity of identity and sameness.29 Such reflexivity, indeed, is an 
inevitable feature of all collective activity, however organised,30—of all bounded contexts of 
decision-making, whether or not professedly democratic. It does not mean either that the 
original constituent body lacks a plausible democratic claim, or that we cannot distinguish 
between more or less plausible such claims.31 It is a matter of sociological investigation how 
much contemporaneous legitimacy a self-proclaimed constituent body enjoys amongst the 
constituency for whom it professes to speak, and, given the operation of an ongoing reflexive 
process, later endorsements and re-endorsements mean that the level of any such social 
legitimacy can vary over time. Yet, these qualifications notwithstanding, there remains 
something arbitrary—something necessarily democratically unfulfilled and in some measure 
self-fulfilling about the original constituent act and signature in its own time. The original 
constitutional imposition of democracy, in other words, is also inevitably an imposition upon 
democracy. 
Similar considerations apply to questions of stakeholding and representation. The 
initial constitutional settlement will either specify or will provide the normative basis for 
                                                
29 See eg Lindahl ibid p14 et seq; see also B Van Roermund, ‘Sovereignty: Unpopular and Popular’ in N Walker 
(ed) Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford: Hart, 2003) 33–54. 
30 See eg H Lindahl ‘Acquiring a Community’ (2003) 9 European Law Journal 433–50 
31 See eg S Chambers, ‘Democracy, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Legitimacy’ (2004) 11 
Constellations 153.  
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specifying who counts in the polity. Categories of citizenship or nationality will set out who 
are full members of the polity for the purposes of taking part in democratic politics (in 
particular, voting and standing for elected office). Constitution-level decisions will be taken, 
or will enable other decisions to be taken, as to who should be ineligible (aliens), or partially 
eligible (those denizens, for example, who may vote in local or supranational elections but 
not in national elections), and how to move though the levels of eligibility (through residence, 
citizenship tests etc). The constitutional framework will also specify, or set out authoritative 
procedures for specifying, which otherwise eligible categories may be disqualified (for 
example, prisoners or minors).32 
In all cases, the identification of those who are deemed to have sufficient stake in the 
polity to be full participating members of its political system, while providing an important 
anchor for the democratic process, is again not itself something that can be compellingly 
derived from democratic principles. Rather, just as with authorship, the initial choice of 
constituency may create a self-reinforcing bias in addressing the question of who counts. This 
is not to say that membership of the polity is something that cannot be plausibly addressed 
and theoretically elaborated from a perspective of democratic principle. Many efforts have 
been made to do so.33 On the one hand, membership of the demos may be seen as something 
that should be restricted to those who enjoy a basic affinity and ‘we-feeling’. Those who 
share a basic level and continuity of sympathetic identification, of mutual trust and respect, 
and perhaps of common belief, may be seen to be a democracy’s ‘natural’ constituency. This 
can be defended in moral philosophical terms, because such an approach to the determination 
of the ‘collective self’ in the democratic process of ‘collective self-government’ may be 
animated by just those considerations of collective autonomy as appear to be so closely 
ethically implicated in the endorsement of the basic idea of procedural democracy itself. 
Additionally, an affinity-based conception of political community can be defended in 
pragmatic terms, because such a cohesive or solidaristic demos is advantageously resourced 
to supply ‘the battery of power’34 necessary to generate effective self-government. On the 
other hand, membership may be seen to be properly tied to the impact of the polity upon 
one’s interests and preferences. From this perspective, democratic theory has produced many 
versions of the ‘all affected’ principle to argue where the line of impact should be drawn and 
                                                
32 For a wide-ranging study of the varied constitutional treatment of democratic membership at both national 
and supranational level in the European Union, see J Shaw The Transformation of Citizenship in the European 
Union (Cambridge: CUP, 2007). 
33 For a recent overview, see D Miller ‘Democracy’s Domain’ (2009) 37 Philosophy and Public Affairs 201–228 
34 M Canovan Nationhood and Political Theory (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 1996). 
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what the appropriate ‘impacted’ constituency of collective self-government should be in any 
functioning polity.35 
Far from a dearth of democratic theory on the question of membership of the demos, 
therefore, what we have is in fact a surplus. These two quite different perspectives, each of 
which also admits of a variety of different possible internal refinements, are apt to draw 
conflicting conclusions, with the affinity- and affect-based approach tending to be the more 
selective and the impact-based approach tending to be the more inclusive.36 What this means 
is that even to the extent that constitutional decisions as to the proper stakeholders of the 
polity are sensitive to democratic considerations and, in the post-constituent moment, remain 
open to arguments that do not simply reinforce the existing constituency’s sense of the proper 
constituency, such considerations themselves are controversial inter se and cannot provide 
definitive answers within the prism of democratic theory and principle.  
For their part, questions of representation suffer from a similar form of democratic 
underdetermination. Modern constitutionalism has been the constitutionalism of large nation 
states, and the democracy it has precipitated has been of the representative kind appropriate 
to large nation states rather than the assembly democracy of Athenian and later small city 
republics. This has raised myriad questions of institutional design. How is it possible to 
ensure representative forms best capable of approximating equality of influence amongst 
members when factors of size and internal differentiation may lead to certain interests and 
preferences being ignored or systematically outweighed? Various systems of representation 
vie with each other to answer questions about the optimal allocation of influence. 
Majoritarian systems of election, oriented towards rewarding parties and constituencies 
possessing a relative majority throughout the entire population with a clear mandate to 
govern, vie with proportional representation systems oriented towards rewarding different 
interests in the community in a statistically accurate manner.37 Unitary systems, oriented 
towards treating the demos as a cultural and institutional singularity, vie with federal or 
consociational systems in which the overall system of representation recognises systematic 
cleavages in the population in terms of sub-territorial national or regional identification or 
                                                
35 See eg J Habermas Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge Mass: MIT Press, 1995); R 
Goodin ‘Enfranchising All Affected Interests and Its Alternatives’ (2007) 35 Philosophy and Public Affairs 40–
68; T MacDonald Global Stakeholder Democracy (Oxford: OUP, 2008). 
36 Miller (n 33) connects these approaches to what he calls ‘L-Democracy’ (ie liberal) and ‘R-Democracy (ie 
radical) respectively, 204–207. 
37 An Interparliamentary Union study of 150 democracies in 1993 revealed 83 majoritarian electoral systems 
and 57 PR systems, with the remainder mixed. Electoral Systems Worldwide: A Comparative Study (Geneva: 
Interparliamentary Union, 1993). 
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other forms of cultural, linguistic or religious affiliation.38 Parliamentary systems oriented 
towards single or coalition party government vie with presidential systems in which 
representative influence is channelled separately to different governmental organs (executive 
and legislative) and executive power is deemed sufficiently distinct to be the subject of the 
special forms of empowerment and constraint associated with the presidential office.39 
 In all cases, again the basic constitutional choice is democratically determining rather 
than democratically determined. There is no one best democratic way how to design a system 
of democratic representation. Partly, this is a question of the different social environments of 
democracies demanding different institutional solutions. However, even if we take into 
account the best evidence of prior patterns of preferences, interests and allegiances in the 
relevant environment, there is no objective, situationally specific, democracy-revealing ‘fact 
of the matter’, but a whole host of contending considerations about how to measure and 
assess effective influence. Granted, the mature representative system may well in fact closely 
track the original balance of voice and influence within the collective authorship of the 
polity—a link which tends to be clearest in federal or consociational systems. Yet this merely 
refers us back to the contingency of the initial authorial formulation, and so demonstrates 
how the answers to constitutional questions of representation, like those of authorship and 
stakeholding, rather than being decided in the domain of disinterested democratic principle 
may be strongly path-dependent. 
If we turn, finally within the category of democracy-realising dimensions of 
constitutionalism, to questions of competence, here somewhat different but ultimately similar 
considerations arise.40 Unlike the other three dimensions, there exists some kind of 
uncontroversial core of democratically mandated constitutional prerequisites to democracy. 
Democracy, even in its thinnest proceduralist understanding, requires certain minimal 
conditions of political and personal freedom on the part of its stakeholders and office-holders. 
Without freedom of speech and freedom of association, and without the due process rights 
associated with liberty from arbitrary arrest or interference by the state, it would be 
impossible to guarantee the basic processes of opinion-formation and dissemination in the 
absence of which no culture of uncoerced collective decision-making on questions of import 
to that collectivity can flourish. But even within these core categories, hard questions arise 
                                                
38 See eg S Choudhry (ed) Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation? 
(Oxford: OUP, 2008). 
39 See eg R Elgie ‘From Linz to Tsebelis: Three Waves of Presidential/Parliamentary Studies?’ (2005) 12 
Democratisation 106–122. 
40 See eg J Waldron Law and Disagreement (Oxford: OUP, 1999) ch 13. 
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about how far we should go. Do we protect only directly ‘political speech’ or is any 
expression and communication of opinion on any matter of potentially public interest to be 
safeguarded? Do we protect only directly political assemblies, or any forms of collective 
coming together, whether in the economic or the religious sphere, that may indirectly impact 
upon collective political opinion-formation and dissemination? Do we treat freedom of 
information—the entitlement to have one’s views informed and one’s preferences influenced 
by the best available evidence on matters of public importance and by detailed monitoring of 
the operation of public services and the behaviour of public officials—as every bit as much a 
prerequisite to democracy as are freedom of speech and association? And what of privacy, 
property, subsistence and security? As a simple causal thesis, are these indispensable planks 
of the platform necessary for the performance of democracy, or can we conceive of a thriving 
democracy in their absence, or, more likely, in their merely heavily qualified presence? And 
what, too, of these competences, which may overlap considerably with those listed above, but 
which are defended, not (or not exclusively) on the basis that they are causally prerequisite to 
democracy, but because they stand in an internal moral relationship to democracy? That is to 
say, they are treated as democratically-relevant competences because they are deemed to 
recognise and protect just those values which it is the moral rationale of democracy to 
recognise and protect—as in Dworkin’s expansive conception of the attitude of equal respect 
and concern for the moral independence of all members of the community. 
So once we get beyond a consensus on the core of prerequisite competences, or, even 
more modestly, a consensus on the bare idea of a core which may itself begin to fray 
immediately we begin to try to delimit that core, democratic principle and theory become 
unable to determine those competences that are required for democracy’s own meaningful 
elaboration. Again, the problem is not a lack of democratic theory, but a surfeit—one that 
marks out this particular question as a key battleground for the standing controversy between 
‘thin’ and ‘thick’ conceptions of democracy. In the final analysis, there is no democratically 
mandated right answer, and again constitutionalism must draw upon resources other than 
democracy in answering one of the unavoidable questions about the realisation of democracy. 
In summary, therefore, we may conclude by noting a distinction between the moral 
and political purpose and the social epistemology of constitutional thinking across the four 
dimensions of democracy-realisation. On the one hand, when addressing the when, who, 
which and wherewith questions, constitutionalist thinking and practice is geared to the 
realisation of democracy. On the other hand, in so doing, although there is much scope for 
drawing upon the resources of democratic thinking in addressing these questions, these 
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democratic resources cannot provide definitive answers. Rather, from a democratic 
perspective a crucial element of contingency remains. Other factors will inevitably play their 
part in the making of key constitutional decisions, and, indeed, so intensely reflexive are the 
democracy-engaging processes set in motion by constitutionalism that there will be a 
tendency towards the reinforcement of foundational biases. 
 
(b) Normative incompleteness; constitutionalism as democracy-supplementing and 
democracy-qualifying  
 
Fifthly, and bringing in the second general relational vector connecting constitutionalism to 
democracy, we may identify a broad and general democracy-supplementing or qualifying 
dimension. As we saw in Section II, this is a domain of constitutional theory and practice 
which attracts a double dose of scepticism. Not only its content, but even its very existence 
stands as controversial between different positions. In particular, any constitutional reference 
point outside of democracy is denied by those who would reduce constitutionalism entirely to 
the service of a procedural version of state democracy, just as, in the recent symbolic pomp of 
democratic constitutionalism, the possibility of a non-democratic constitutional supplement 
has been glossed over even by those, such as Dworkin, and to a somewhat lesser extent 
Habermas, whose much ‘thicker’ constitutional vision is presented as nothing more than the 
full working out of the premises of democratic theory. Accordingly, this fifth category is one 
best defined negatively and open-endedly. It addresses the question of what, if any, are the 
other, non-democratic values, whether understood in terms of individual rights or collective 
goods that ought to be pursued and upheld by the constitution (the what else question)?  
The list of candidate values here looks very like the open-ended list we perused 
previously under the democracy-realising head of prerequisite competences. Such individual 
rights as property and subsistence, together with other basic welfare or social rights would 
figure prominently, as would certain public goods less easily reduced to an aggregation of 
individual rights, such as security and education. So too, at a higher level of abstraction, 
would some general desiderata which might in some catalogues be seen as part of a 
democratic conception of the good sensu largo, but which might equally in other moral 
schemes be seen as equiprimordial or interdependent with, rather than reducible to, 
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democracy, or indeed as deeper values served by democracy. We are talking here of values as 
broadly pitched as equality, liberty, dignity or fraternity.41  
 This last category of more abstract values neither reducible to nor in conflict with but 
somehow interwoven with democracy is an intriguing one, and one to which we return in the 
concluding Section. But for the moment, it is necessary to lay down a broader marker about 
the knowledge claims associated with all putative members of the category of democracy-
supplementing or qualifying values. The point here is not to seek to draw the unequivocal 
conclusion that the kinds of constitutional claims which might be and frequently are made on 
behalf of such individual and collective values, however concrete or abstract, are necessarily 
additional to or inconsistent with democracy. That would be to make an equal and opposite 
error to those who would declare with similar conviction that any and all such constitutional 
values are necessarily implied by and so ultimately reducible to democracy (however thinly 
or thickly conceived).  
Rather, all we can confidently say is that there is no generally agreed understanding of 
democracy on the basis of which all other candidate constitutional values are necessarily 
implied by and reducible to its terms. Given the wide range of possible understandings of 
democracy, indeed, the most we can hope for by way of agreement as to democracy’s core 
meaning is some kind of overlapping consensus across that wide range. However, since any 
conception of democracy (or rather, any shared dimension of various and diverse conceptions 
of democracy) capable of attracting the requisite overlapping consensus could be no more 
than a thin proceduralist one, there would remain many other candidate constitutional values 
palpably not reducible to the terms of that thin consensus. In other words, to the extent that 
there is or could be minimum agreement about democracy as a cornerstone of 
constitutionalism, that agreement does not and could not extend far enough to cover the many 
other candidate constitutional values to which at least some parties to any such minimal 
agreement would subscribe. We have no choice, therefore, when seeking to make sense of 
modern constitutionalism in a way that does not close off options by (deeply controversial) 
definitional fiat, but to hold open the putative category of non-democratic values. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
41 See eg Dworkin (n 9) 25–6. See also Waldron (n 40) ch 13. 
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(c) Empirical and Normative Incompleteness: Two mixed constitutional functions  
 
We can complete our catalogue of modern constitutional functional domains by referring to 
two such functions straddling the distinction between democracy-realising and democracy-
qualifying.  
Sixthly, then, constitutionalism also addresses democratic incompleteness at the level 
of implementation of the overall system of government (the how question). Just because 
constitutional law, uniquely amongst categories of law within the positive legal order of the 
modern state, cannot resort to any higher socially-sourced and institutionally-grounded legal 
authority in support of its own normative purposes, it must take responsibility for its own 
effectiveness as law. This work of self-execution can in turn be sub-divided into normative or 
regulatory design questions, and integrative or cultural questions.42 
 Normatively, what institutional framework—that is to say, what particular 
combination and interconnection of legislative, executive and judicial functions and 
institutions, will best reflect and achieve the normative values and purposes of the 
constitution? Importantly, just because these deep normative purposes may be mixed, relating 
to democracy and (arguably) non-democratic values alike, so too their implementation may 
reflect this mixity of democracy-realising and democracy-supplementing or -qualifying 
functions. For example, an independent emphasis on those presumptively non-democratic 
values based on individual rights might be thought to be well served by a strong regime of 
judicial review of legislation and of administrative discretion.43 Or a strong emphasis on the 
goods of internal and external security might be thought to be well served by a strong 
emergency powers regime against internal and external threats, or by protecting certain types 
of executive action from close contemporaneous involvement or scrutiny by the other 
branches of government.44 Equally, even to the extent that the normative design of the 
constitution is only concerned with the implementation of the value of democracy, this will 
by no means always require democracy ‘all the way down’. Rather, even the fullest and 
‘purest’ commitment to the collective procedures of self-rule will accept that the very 
objective of collective self-rule will be frustrated if it is extended to very nook and cranny of 
decision-making relevant to that collectivity. Rather, in order to be effective as self-rule. 
                                                
42 See eg D Grimm ‘Integration by Constitution’ (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 193–208. 
43 Although as Waldron argues, this does not necessarily follow, and a robust conception of rights protection can 
be defended as compatible with a constitutionally unchecked system of majoritarian legislation. See n 40 ch 10 
‘Between Rights and Bills of Rights’. 
44 For a critical appraisal of these types of arguments in the post 9/11 United States environment, see S Holmes 
The Matador’s Cape: America’s Reckless Response to Terror (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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democratic procedures in a large and complex modern polity inevitably are required to be 
supplemented in some measure (the extent and forms of which, however, are themselves a 
matter of significant controversy and dispute) by certain ‘depoliticising’ mechanisms that 
instead emphasise expertise, disinterestedness, dispassionate analysis or deliberative 
rationality.45 
 Culturally, to what extent can the constitution assist in promoting and sustaining the 
cultural conditions most conducive to its own effective implementation? This requires us to 
look at the symbolic rather than the normative performance of the constitution. We noted in 
our discussion of stakeholding above that democratic theory will often favour constitutional 
conceptions of membership that stress the affinity and mutual sympathy of the members. 
When we come to consider the role of constitutionalism in the implementation of its own 
normative programme, however, the constitution itself no longer simply reflects existing 
solidarities. Rather, it seeks through its own symbolic resonance to cultivate existing or new 
solidarities.46 Typically, it does so by means of encouraging an attachment to itself or to its 
key institutions (eg a Parliament, a presidential office, a Supreme Court, a monarchy), 
whether through the inclusive procedure or successful fact of its generation or—more 
significantly in the long run—in the case of a mature settlement, due to ‘the people attributing 
to [it] a metalegal meaning’ as the durable standard bearer of the ‘achievements and 
aspirations of society’.47 Again, as with the normative dimension of implementation, this 
symbolic dimension has to do with the effectiveness of the whole, and so it cuts across such 
democratic and other values as may be contained in the constitutional settlement.  
Seventhly, and finally, constitutionalism has also always asked and answered the 
boundary questions of democracy (the where question). It has been required to specify the 
territorial or and functional ‘scope’48 of the polity. And like questions of implementation, 
questions of demarcation have traversed the divide between democracy-realising and 
democracy-qualifying functions. On the one hand, territorial questions are typically 
democracy-realising. A specification of the territorial boundaries of the polity must be made 
prior to the realisation of a democratic system, but in so doing it need not engage values 
which directly rival or qualify democracy itself. Rather, what will be germane will be a mix 
                                                
45 See eg P Pettit ‘Depoliticising Democracy’ (2004) 17 Ratio Juris 52–65. 
46 For a comparative analysis of the different trajectories of cultivation of communal solidarities in different 
constitutional models, see M Rosenfeld The Identity of the Constitutional Subject: Selfhood, Citizenship, 
Culture and Community (London and New York: Routledge, 2010) esp chs 5–7. 
47 D Grimm (n 42) at 204. 
48 R Bellamy and D Castiglione ‘Legitimising the Euro-‘Polity’ and its ‘Regime’: The Normative Turn in EU 
Studies’ (2003) 2 European Journal of Political Theory 7–34. 
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of external geopolitical considerations of the relative strength and overall alignment of 
powers within the region and the kind of internal associative considerations we have already 
encountered in our discussion of constitutionalism’s democratic stakeholding criteria. A 
specification of the functional boundaries of the polity, on the other hand, by defining certain 
spheres as within or out of democratic bounds, whether this be the system of private property 
or the organisation of religion, may well do so in direct consequence of and in furtherance of 
its engagement with other, presumptively non-democratic, fundamental values. 
 
IV. The Global Age of Constitutionalism  
It is this seventh constitutional function of demarcation, as we shall see, that has been 
radically transformed under contemporary conditions of globalisation. But why and how has 
this happened? 
 If we think of globalisation as speaking to the various intersecting ways in which 
different circuits of power and influence cut across national boundaries with increasing 
intensity,49 then we can begin to appreciate how this leads to changes in our understanding of 
constitutionalism in general and constitutionalism’s relationship to democracy in particular. 
In a nutshell the constitutionally relevant effects of the growth of various transnational 
circuits of power and influence to which the contemporary wave of globalisation refers, from 
the increasing flow of capital, goods, people and services, to the growth of new 
communications media, to new intercultural influences and institutional forms, can be 
categorised under the heads of new challenges, new opportunities and new preferences 
respectively.  
As regards challenges, present-day state democracies increasingly find themselves 
impotent to deal with issues that take the form either of externalities—how decisions taken in 
one state have a serious impact on people living in other states—or, relatedly, of new 
collective action problems that can only be resolved by co-ordination or co-regulation at a 
transnational level. Whether we are dealing with global banking and investment markets, the 
flow of refugees, transnational criminality, the spread of infectious diseases or global climate 
change, individual states increasingly lack the rules and resources to address the relevant 
questions on their own. Alongside these challenges and constraints, and acting both as 
response and reinforcing cause, there are new opportunities for co-ordination. Since the 
middle of the 20th century, with the initial impetus provided by the post-war internationalism 
                                                
49 For a representative range of contemporary thinking on globalisation, see A Jones Globalisation: Key 
Thinkers (Cambridge: Polity, 2010). 
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of the United Nations, there has developed a range of global and regional institutions and 
regulatory forms possessing a mixture of territorial and functional jurisdictions. These 
institutions and forms are empowered to address new transnational regulatory problems, but 
they also contribute to them in two ways. They do so first, by further disempowering state 
institutions—for example, the EU, by introducing a single currency and by limiting state aids 
to national economic concerns in the name of economic union, severely restricts the way in 
which individual member states can respond to a domestic economic crisis.50 They do so 
secondly by providing the means not just to respond to existing problems but to produce new 
forms of transnational interconnectedness, for example, less restricted cross-border 
movement of persons, corporations, goods and services, which in the scale and intensity of 
activity and interconnection they enable (eg more multinational corporations with a stake in 
many states, more interdependent transport, more interdependent money markets, larger dual-
national or denizen communities) in turn generate new externalities and new collective action 
problems. At the level of preference structures, too, globalisation is a double-edged sword. 
The development of transnational interests and value structures can create new global or 
universal normative standards and vernaculars—for example as regards human rights.51 Yet 
by bringing different cultures into overlap, it can also create new or heightened oppositions 
and enmities, as with the rise of new forms of regionally sourced fundamentalism.52 
The regulatory circuits that develop within this complex set of movements affect the 
demarcation dimension of constitutionalism in two apparently opposite but connected ways, 
with various ramifications for other dimensions of constitutionalism. In some cases, 
globalisation engenders more and more heavily overlapping boundaries relevant to 
constitutionalism, while in others, by contrast, it dispenses with the logic of boundaries 
altogether. 
Globalisation engenders more boundaries and more heavily overlapping boundaries to 
the extent that it encourages the creation of new post-state polities, paradigmatically the EU, 
but increasingly too the other regional economic unions, which no longer stand in a 
relationship of mutual exclusivity with each other or with state polities.53 That is to say, the 
more basic integrity of boundaries under the modern state system, the sense that the 
constitutional limits, wherever marked out, would be coincidental with the limits of other 
                                                
50 As was spectacularly illustrated in the Greek debt crisis of the early summer of 2010. 
51 See eg C Gearty, Can Human Rights Survive? (Cambridge: CUP, 2005). 
52 See eg Ruthven (n 15) above. 
53 See eg my ‘Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder of Normative Orders’ 
(2008) 7 International Journal of Constitutional Law 373–396. 
 23 
constitutional polities, and that in this way internal sovereignty would be aligned with 
external sovereignty, no longer holds. This in turn creates two sets of difficulties, which we 
may again illustrate through the example of the EU as an entity notorious both for its 
‘democratic deficit’ and for its institutional complexity. On the one hand, by dividing up 
democratic functions into a greater number of polity ‘slices’, the EU threatens vital resources 
of democracy-enabling political culture at both state and post-state level, On the other hand, 
as the political life of individuals and communities is increasingly dispersed across a variety 
of polities, the complex and obscure technology of the coordination and co-articulation of 
these different regimes becomes key to life-chances. 
 On both of these counts, each of constitutionalism’s democracy-realising functions 
become more urgent, more stretched and more likely to encounter problems. As the aborted 
constitutional settlement of the EU in 2003–5 demonstrated, authorship problems are 
compounded in a postnational unit whose constituent power—perhaps the European people, 
perhaps the European peoples, or perhaps a mixture of the two—is a matter of deep dispute, 
not least because it overlaps the sources of constituent power of the pre-existing states.54 
Membership criteria, too, become more problematic in the European Union when one is 
dealing with a secondary political community in which every citizen is always already a 
citizen of a primary state community, and where the presence of both intra-EU second 
country nationals and non-EU third country nationals provide a more graduated and less 
clearly demarcated sense of distance from the citizenship core than under the traditional 
insider/outsider dichotomies of one-dimensional state citizenship.55 For their part, 
constitutional systems of democratic representation have been predicated on the exclusivity 
of the democratic arenas they inhabit, and it becomes difficult to make constitutional sense of 
representative prospects and possibilities when this logic of exclusivity is displaced. 
Arguments about federalism take on a new dimension in political configurations that are 
multi-level rather than just two–level; arguments about consociationalism become more 
complex when the number of overlapping minorities expands; arguments about the relative 
merits of strong parliamentarianism or presidentialism are confounded when there are a 
multiplicity of parliaments and presidents located at different levels.56 What is more, if we 
turn to the democracy-realising dimension of constitutional implementation, the new split- 
                                                
54 See my ‘Post-Constituent Constitutionalism in the EU’ in Loughlin and Walker (eds) (n 29) above, 247–268. 
55 See eg Shaw, (n 32); N Walker, ‘Denizenship and Deterritorialisation in the EU’ in H Lindahl (ed) A Right to 
Inclusion and Exclusion? (Oxford: Hart, 2009) 261–72. 
56 See eg V Bader, ‘Complex Citizenship and Legitimacy in Compound Polities (MLPs and MLG): The EU as 
Example.’ EUROSPHERE, WP 1 (2008). 
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and multi-level system produces not only problems of complexity at the normative level but 
also motivational problems at the cultural level. Much of the criticism of the EU constitution 
as a false constitution, or as a ‘low intensity constitution’,57 or as a treaty masquerading as a 
constitution, and much of the popular endorsement of that criticism in the backlash against 
the constitution culminating in the referendum defeats of 2005 in France and Holland, had to 
do with the perceived symbolic overkill of political elites seeking to attach the rhetoric of 
constitutionalism to such an apparently deracinated political form as a post-state polity.58  
 This multiplication of boundaries stands in stark contrast to the other self-styled 
postnational constitutional development. For a second form of constitutional initiative for the 
global age concerns the attribution of constitutional credentials to normative phenomena that 
are not in any strong sense polity-specific or polity-demarcated. Elsewhere, I have discussed 
many of these trends under the heading of ‘beyond the holistic constitution’.59 The holistic 
constitution, again with the state as its paradigm form, is a constitution that seeks to embrace 
and contain the polity as whole and at a number of different levels simultaneously—in terms 
of formal legal sovereignty and comprehensive institutional design as much as in terms of the 
exclusivity of the underlying claim to popular political sovereignty or the reference to a 
distinct political and cultural ‘society’. Even where these latter thick elements are in 
jeopardy, there may, as in the case of the EU, still be a holistic element at the level of ‘own’ 
legal system and institutional design. In the new post-holistic constitutionalism, in contrast, 
constitutional claims are far more partial, constitutional traces far more fragmentary. They 
concern regional or global human rights treaties, the specific peace-keeping dimensions of 
the UN Charter, or developed single issue ‘sectoral’60 treaty regimes in areas such as climate 
change or international crime. They concern the thin universalism of certain core principles 
of customary international law. They concern private or hybrid public/private self-regulatory 
regimes for transnational functions such as sport (eg IOC, FIFA) or the internet (eg ICANN). 
What these highly diverse forms have in common is their lack of holistic attributes, their 
absence of claims to comprehensive authority in any register, whether legal, institutional, 
political or societal. The multi-layered regulatory intensity and self-sufficiency of the holistic 
                                                
57 See M Maduro, ‘The Importance of Being Called a Constitution; Constitutional Authority and the Authority 
of Constitutionalism’ (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 332–356 
58 See eg my ‘Not the European Constitution’ (2008) 15 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 
15–21. 
59 See my ‘Beyond the Holistic Constitution?’ in P Dobner and M Loughlin (eds) The Twilight of 
Constitutionalism? (Oxford: OUP, 2010) 291–308. 
60 A Peters ‘Membership in the Global Constitutional Community’ in J Klabbérs, A Peters and G Ulfstein (eds) 
The Constitutionalisation of International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2009). 
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polity is substituted by the open-ended scope and connectivity of a more networked pattern of 
regulation. What is more, to the extent that these initiative are proclaimed to be 
constitutional—and it is striking how widespread the language of constitutionalism has 
become in certain old corners of international law as well as in some of the new functional 
regimes61—they tend to concentrate on values other than democracy, and so focus on what 
we traditionally understood as the democracy-qualifying and supplementing functions of 
constitutionalism when applied in the state-democratic setting. For the mixture of individual 
rights and public goods with which the new forms of transnational post-holistic 
constitutionalism are typically concerned, from peace and environmental security to 
consumer sovereignty and the protection of ‘first generation’ freedoms and ‘second 
generation’ social rights, are those that are quite widely understood as distinctive from and 
perhaps challenging to democracy, or at least as in keeping with an expansive sense of 
democracy’s meaning and purposes. 
 
V. The Resilience of Democratic Incompleteness in Constitutionalism’s 
Global Age 
 
Earlier I suggested that the onset of the global age of constitutionalism has generated a new 
opposition. There is an increasingly sharp division of views between those who see the 
constitutional paradigm as approaching exhaustion in the global age and those who see it as 
undergoing a transformation and reinvigoration. The former tend to concentrate on the 
hollowing out of state polities as the traditional hosts of democratic constitutionalism, the 
depleted democratic credentials of post-state polity alternatives, and the one-sidedness of a 
post-holistic constitutionalism seemingly remote from any idea or practice of democracy.62 
The latter, while by no means necessarily unconcerned about the fate of national or 
postnational democracy,63 concentrate instead on the added value of the new transnational 
forms. 
                                                
61 For critical perspectives on the spread of international constitutional discourse, see M Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate 
of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics’ (2007) 70 Modern Law Review 1–30; D Kennedy, 
‘The Mystery of Global Governance’ in Dunoff and Trachtman (n 25) at 37–68. 
62 See Grimm, (n 4). See also essays by Loughlin (‘What is Constitutionalisation?’, 47-72) and Grimm ‘The 
Achievement of Constitutionalism and its Prospects in a Changed World’, 3-22) in Dobner and Loughlin (n 59). 
63 One important sub-distinction here is between those like Anne Peters (see her ‘Compensatory 
Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms and Structures’ (2006) 19 
Leiden Journal of International Law 579–610, who talk about the ‘compensatory’ quality of constitutionalism at 
the postnational level, so acknowledging the basic loss to constitutionalism (as well as to democracy) as a whole 
occasioned by the diminution of democratic constitutionalism at the national level; and those who believe that 
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What both of these positions deny or downplay, in their very different ways, is the 
continuing significance of constitutionalism’s double relationship with democracy. On the 
first view, there is no or limited value in looking to the non-democratic virtues of 
constitutionalism in and across settings where these are not balanced by democratic capacity 
and by the forms of constitutionalism associated with realising that capacity. 
Constitutionalism as a means of realising democracy, from this perspective, is so central to 
the constitutional function that any constitutionalism that professes itself as such in the 
absence of realised or realisable democratic forms is wholly or largely dismissed. On the 
second view, by contrast, the forms of constitutionalism at the postnational level are reckoned 
to be in no sense compromised by their lack of democratic credentials.  
In conclusion, I want to argue that each position dismisses the relevance of 
constitutionalism’s other relationship to democracy too quickly. As regards the defenders of 
postnational constitutionalism without democracy, ideological and meta-democratic 
considerations counsel against any complacent acceptance of their position. As for those who 
hold postnational constitutionalism to be valueless or essentially diminished due to the 
declining resonance of state democracy, broader structural and moral considerations demand 
that this position likewise be not too readily affirmed. In either case, it is at root the resilience 
of constitutionalism’s double relationship to democracy which prompts this conclusion. 
 Let us take first the two objections that might be levelled against those who would 
defend postnational constitutionalism without democracy. Ideologically, constitutionalism, 
for all the fashionable claims of today’s postnational adherents concerning the global appeal 
of the values it represents, has traditionally been a situated discourse. It has nurtured and 
preserved its authority as being embedded within a particular political setting. Constitutional 
design in some respect inspired by general constitutional thinking may frame the particular 
polity, but the particular polity also provides a vital context for the authoritative interpretation 
of constitutionalist’s framing values. When, for example, Habermas talks of constitutional 
patriotism,64 his pivotal point is that the general values of constitutionalism have to be 
adopted by a community as their own before they can achieve any ideological resonance. 
Their patriotism is not centred on the ideas of constitutionalism in the abstract, but on general 
constitutional values as mediated and concretised through their own particular political and 
                                                                                                                                                  
the trend in favour of the redirection of constitutionalism towards non-democratic transnational settings, while 
undoubtedly transformative of the role of constitutionalism, does not necessarily entail any depletion in the 
value of constitutionalism as a regulatory ethic (see eg essays by G Teubner, ‘Fragmented Foundations: Societal 
Constitutionalism Beyond the Nation State’ and by UK Preuss, ‘Disconnecting Constitutions from Statehood: Is 
Global Constitutionalism a Viable Concept?’ in Dobner and Loughlin (eds) (n 59).  
64 See eg the essays collected in his The Postnational Constellation (Cambridge: Polity, 2001, M Pensky trans). 
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cultural history. The increased and increasingly effective mobility of constitutional ideas,65 it 
follows, is not based upon the infinite scope of an abstract universalism, but upon the 
context-variant replicabilty and adaptability of a particular model of political thought across 
different times and places. And so it is that constitutional thought finds it hard to gain traction 
in non-polity embedded contexts. It further follows that we should be suspicious of the 
impact and value of a purely ‘external’ and polity-disembodied academic discourse of 
constitutional thought—of those claims that find no or only faint echo and those labels that 
find little endorsement, say, in the actual insider self-understanding and practice of this self-
regulating transnational entity, or of that global functional regime, or of these general 
regimens of international law.  
Secondly, and closely related to the question of the presence or absence of a situated 
polity, as a matter of historical practice, even where constitutionalism involves the 
qualification of democracy, the terms of such qualification tend to possess a meta-democratic 
pedigree. The idea of popular sovereignty and constituent power, as we have seen, is an early 
and central theme of political modernity. It is one that predates effective operational 
democracy, and one, consequently, that does not necessarily imply a democratic form of 
government. Yet its performative meaning is itself a form of higher order- or meta-
democracy—of a democracy about democracy (or about whatever other form of quotidian 
political organisation is chosen). An apparent difficulty with most postnational forms of 
constitutionalism, therefore, is that as well as not being grounded in quotidian democratic 
arrangements, they typically lack even this kind of meta-democratic founding.  
Where the absence of such foundations is not simply ignored or passed over as an 
unavoidable deficit by the defenders of postnational constitutionalism, democratic authority 
is either claimed to be supplied indirectly—a pooled delegation of national democratic 
authority, or dismissed as somehow irrelevant or even inappropriate to the non-democratic 
values and forms of political organisation with which it is concerned.66 But such responses 
are not convincing. As regards the argument from delegation, this raises structural questions, 
duly considered below, to which as we shall see no fully satisfactory answer can be given. As 
regards the redundancy argument, the notion that non-democratic values and forms do not in 
any case require a democratic pedigree can be quite simply turned on its head. As we saw in 
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our discussion of the traditional dimensions of the relationship between constitutionalism and 
democracy, both the question of the existence and content of non-democratic constitutional 
values and that of the nature and extent of non-democratic forms of implementation of even 
the most procedurally unimpeachable general systems of collective self-rule, are themselves 
controversial. All the more reason, then, that a democratically-aware transnational 
constitutionalism endeavours to ensure that such non-democratic values and forms retain 
some kind of meta-democratic imprimatur and backstop accountability.  
Yet while these factors pose difficult challenges to postnational constitutionalism, and 
ensure a sceptical reception for it beyond the narrow academic or specialist confines where it 
is sponsored, we should not push this too far. The ideas of postnational constitutionalism 
should not be dismissed out of hand just because they lack a polity-specific embedding or a 
meta-democratic pedigree, and so just because they may perform no democracy-realising 
function within a discrete polity. Again, there are two reasons for this. 
 First, in structural terms, we have already noted that in the global age of overlapping 
polities and of individual and community life-chances becoming spread across different 
polity sites, the relational dimension is key. No less important in the assessment of overall 
constitutional legitimacy than the discrete democratic credentials of a particular constitutional 
setting, therefore, are the ways in which particular constitutional points and vectors, 
themselves lacking in democratic credentials, may connect to other more strongly democratic 
settings in the relevant constitutional constellations of particular actors or communities; for 
example, the ways in which a regional human rights catalogue such as the European 
Convention of Human Rights of the (democratically attenuated) Council of Europe informs 
judicial review of legislative and executive action in the procedurally democratic (or, at least, 
aspirationally democratic) environment of 47 European states. This is not to say, of course, 
that every non-democratic site is somehow fully democratically homologated through the 
option of the adoption of its norms by the traditional democratic site of the state. Rather, it is 
to suggest that if any integrated assessment of constitutional legitimacy has always depended 
upon how constitutionalism responds to the two forms of democratic incompleteness—
addressing the ways in which democracy requires to be realised at the same time as 
addressing the ways in which democracy requires to be supplemented or qualified—then the 
new forms of constitutional connections available between constitutional sites mean that this 
is an assessment which may now plausibly be made across sites and not merely within one.  
Such a response, however, tends to accept much of the force of the ideological and 
meta-democratic critique. Its aim is somehow, through an idea of democratic pedigree and 
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delegation or transfer, to reconnect a constitutionalism of non-democratic values with a 
democratic source. To that extent it will always remain vulnerable to the objection that in the 
global age the connection becomes an attenuated one, essentially second best to a single and 
holistically conceived polity solution. Indeed, the trend within the global regulatory 
configuration towards an ever more complex range of private and hybrid transnational forms 
is exacerbating this problem, rendering national democratic pedigree an ever more remote or 
even irrelevant source of endorsement without necessarily revealing new and alternative sites 
and forms of democratic pedigree.67  
 However, there is a deeper response to postnational constitutional scepticism. This 
response turns not on a structural connection but instead on an as yet insufficiently-
acknowledged internal moral connection between constitutionalism in its democracy-
realising and democracy-qualifying modes.  
We can approach this by asking the broad question of how constitutionalism fits into 
what Charles Taylor calls the overall ‘moral order’ of modernity—referring to our most basic 
‘natural’, unremarked and so often invisible understanding of the world and of our place and 
purpose in it.68 From that perspective, the age of modern constitutionalism was not just about 
an innovative political architecture centred on the modern state. It was also the age at which a 
new cluster of mutually reinforcing values gradually came to define the deeper moral order; 
in particular individualism, egalitarianism, constructivism and progressivism. The idea of the 
individual as the basic moral unit in the world, and the consequential notion of the 
presumptive equality of all such basic moral units, replaced the medieval idea of human 
existence as part of an integrated whole in which different strata of society were accorded 
distinct stations and roles. Additionally, the notion that the world is constructed from our own 
evolved knowledge and practice, and that, over secular time, we seek to improve the world on 
our own terms on the basis of that knowledge and experience, is new to the modern age. It 
replaced the idea of human understanding, conduct and striving being oriented towards or 
judged against a pregiven order of things, situated not in secular time but in some sacred or 
                                                
67 One obvious alternative source of democratic pedigree is the regional polity, and this has been a central theme 
in the debate over the constitutional legitimacy of the EU (see references at nn 54–58 above). Less obviously, 
but just as significant if not more significant in the long term, a case may be made for viewing certain 
functionally specialist self-constituting transnational private or hybrid regimes as democratic, or at least as its 
functional equivalent. They may be argued to be so to the extent that they seek to give voice to those interests 
most affected in their narrow focal policy field against a backdrop of the proliferation of other such specialist 
self-constituting sites and associated ‘democratic’ opportunities and a corresponding decline in influence of 
holistic state polities; see eg Teubner (n 63). The kind of deep transformation of the very context of democracy 
contemplated here takes us to the heart of the question of the relationship between the resilient moral order of 
modernity and its changing architecture considered in the text below.  
68 C Taylor Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004) 23. 
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otherwise ‘higher’ metaphysical time. In other words, individualism succeeded holism, 
equality succeeded status, constructivism succeeded essentialism and finite progress 
succeeded infinite conformity. The modern world was now, for the first time, something to be 
made over in their own terms by presumptively free and equal individuals.69 
Arguably, it is these elements of the moral order and its associated social imaginary 
that provide the deep context out of which our modern understanding of constitutionalism 
and democracy alike emerge. Crucially, although the relationship between the two purposes 
of constitutionalism—the articulation of democracy as the motor of a constructive and 
progressive approach to the world by free and equal individuals and associations of 
individuals and the qualification of democracy in term of other individual rights and 
collectively accomplishable and beneficial goods on the basis of the very same cluster of 
deep commitments to individualism, equality and designed progress—remains problematic 
and controversial, we can begin to see how these twin purposes belong together 
notwithstanding such continuing conflict. For constitutionalism and democracy are joined not 
in the sense that one conceptually reduces to or is assimilated by the other, or that they are 
otherwise fully mutually presupposed, or because they are bound in a relationship of 
necessary and sufficient mutual causality. Rather, they are joined in the sense that they refer 
to common aspects of the same underlying moral order which, just because they are common 
such aspects—because they are woven out of the same moral fabric—are inextricable even as 
they remain in mutual tension. What is more, this very combination of mutual inextricability 
and mutual tension helps to account for how—as trailed in Section II above—our 
contemporary political and constitutional theory expends so much effort in the infinitely 
suggestive but ceaselessly controversial exercise of working out the precise relationship 
between them.  
Two important implications follow from this understanding of the character of the 
underlying moral order. First, the grand and remorseless project of working out the 
relationship between constitutionalism and democracy cannot be resolved by reference to 
some definitive and singular formula embracing both. That is why, indeed, the exercise is 
infinitely suggestive and ceaselessly controversial. For if the underlying moral order could be 
reduced to any such deeper foundational terms, then this would simply be another—in this 
case hierarchical—route, to the perfect compatibility of democracy and constitutionalism. But 
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what we have, to repeat, is inextricability without perfect compatibility—hence the double 
aspect of constitutionalism as a means both to realise and to qualify democracy.70 
 Secondly, on this view of the crucial and resilient importance of the underlying moral 
fabric of modernity, the long-familiar pattern of state-centred democracy and state-centred 
constitutionalism as a response to the double incompleteness of democracy can no longer be 
elevated to the ‘one best way’ of collective self-design. Rather, this supplies no more than 
one particular and ultimately contingent architectural formation for the modern moral order.71 
And if the environment which supports that architecture alters, as it has gradually done in the 
globalising age, and it becomes no longer possible to arrange the political world as a series of 
mutually exclusive state polities, then we need to find, and, crucially, we may be capable of 
finding an adjusted architecture to accommodate the underlying moral order rather than 
assuming that there was only ever one political architecture fit for modernity.72  
From this perspective, constitutionalism’s ambivalent, double-edged relationship to 
democracy remains vital to the political understanding and regulation of the global age. For 
that ambivalence continues to capture something key about the nested centrality, rather than 
the singular pre-eminence, of democracy to the moral order of modernity. It reminds us that 
constitutionalism must continue to seek to articulate and realise democracy at the same time 
as it endeavours to qualify and challenge democracy in ways that are nevertheless justifiable 
from democracy’s broader moral horizon—even if this drama will no longer be played out in 
full across each and every mutually exclusive and neatly replicable state form, but distributed 
unevenly over the networked space of global society. 
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